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In and Out of Public Solution:
The Hidden Perils of Property Transfer
by

Richard A. Epstein*
I. Pervasive Factions
One obvious virtue of the United States Constitution, at least in its original
conception, is its clear and articulated vision of the proper role of government.
Although the drafters of the Constitution had not read Buchanan and Tullock’s
The Calculus of Consent,1 they were fully cognizant of the dangers that factions
posed to the operation of the political system. Madison defined faction to cover
“a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole,
who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion or interest,
adverse to the rights of the citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests
2
of the community.”
This definition, in concise yet artful language reveals the massive challenge
posed to any political order that is intent on combating these dangers. Madison
rightly concluded that factions could constitute either a majority or minority of
the population, such that they continue to operate no matter what the alignment
of forces within the political community. In more operational terms, Madison’s
definition implies that faction arises whenever any group will maximize its own
position by adopting a plan of action at cross purposes with the larger society of
which it is a part.
Once he states the problem, however, Madison fails to advance any cure
equal to its pervasive magnitude, relying somewhat lamely on the extended
republic to eliminate the pettiness and parochialism of local politics. In large
measure, he takes that position because the original Constitution relied largely
on structural protections (separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism)
to counter the risks of faction. A better approach to counter the risk of faction,
however, lies in the creation and protection of property rights, of which the only
hint in the unamended Constitution is found in the contracts clause.3 Only the
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. My
thanks to the participants of the Work-in-Progress Workshop at the University of Chicago for
helpful comments, and to Robert Alt for his research assistance.
1 James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (1962).
2 James Madison, The Federalist No 10, at 54 (James Madison) at 54 (Edward M. Earle, ed.
1937)
3 No state shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts. U.S. Const. Art. I., §
10. Madison took a strong view that this clause operated as a bulwark against the abuse of
private rights. “The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has

adoption of the Bill of Rights, binding on the federal government, and of the
Reconstruction Amendments, binding on the states, used explicit constitutional
guarantees to protect private property against political expropriation. Thus the
Fifth Amendment guarantee, “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation” and the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty and property,
without due process of law.” The creation of strong property rights limits the
options available to government and thus the potential scope of factions.
Property rights are thus good not only for the incentives that they give to
individuals to develop the resources under their command: only those who sow
should reap is an agricultural metaphor on the internalization of gain that does
not lose it luster in an Internet economy. But it simultaneously limits the range of
political action and thus the range of political intrigue. As ever the task is one of
social improvement, not of social perfection. Constitutional guarantees of
property rights do not negate use of legislative power, but only strip away at its
excesses. The acid test is whether these property-based guarantees improve the
ratio of well-designed legislative actions to misguided ones.
Toward that end, these guarantees first prohibit egregious forms of public
misconduct that might prove politically unsaleable in any event. These include,
most notably, the outright confiscation of land by government officials and the
total invalidation of private debt by government decree. The imposition of
protections confined to these extreme cases only invite the substitution of more
subtle forms of political action that achieve large portions of the factional
enterprise while insulating legislators and regulators from any constitutional
check. A property owner may be left in possession of his land, but required to
grant an easement over the property to another person or group in order to build
4
an ordinary home; or he may be subject to novel limitations on uses that disturb
habitat for endangered species. The debtor may be required to pay the debt, but
5
allowed an extension of time in which to pay off the obligation. The task of
constitutional regulation is not systematic unless some effort is made to control
the close substitutes to which a crafty legislature may turn if the direct path to
property confiscation or debt repudiation is blocked.

directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and indignation that sudden changes and
legislative interferences, in cases involving personal rights, become jobs in the hands of
enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the more-industrious and less-informed
part of the community.” The Federalist No. 44, (James Madison), supra note 2, at 291. For my
views on that subject, see Richard A. Epstein, “Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause,”
51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703 (1984).
4 See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (striking down ordinance that
required the surrender of lateral easement across land in exchange for the right to build ordinary
beach front home).
5 On mortgage moratoria, see Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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The problem here is a familiar one, for often the shoe is on the other foot.
Many state prohibitions on individual conduct make sense. Yet the individuals
who chafe under these restrictions will resort to clever stratagems to defeat
sensible systems of regulation. The early law of torts started with prohibitions
against the direct use of force. It has always been illegal to kill a person by
beating them with a club. Yet both Roman and common law found it necessary
to amend the basic prohibition on killing to cover those close substitutes that fell,
as it was called, within the “equity” of the statute. In functional terms, anyone
who were barred from killing with sticks, knives and guns had to be barred as
6
well from, setting traps and poisoning their victims. A similar quandary is found
in the law of patents, which of course deals with the creation and protection of
intellectual property rights. The patent application covers at least the invention
properly described within the patent. But the so-called doctrine of equivalents
was developed to protect patent holders against erosion from a wide range of
small, easily engineered, modifications of the basic design that would resourceful
new entrants to evade the reach of the patent.7
In both these instances, the critical question is what sort of substitute counts
as “close.” Let the substitutes be imperfect and far removed, and the cost of
preventing abuse cuts too deeply into legitimate transactions. Let the close
substitutes be defined too narrowly and resourceful individuals can camp out at
their edges. A priori, it is never quite clear how close the legal system can inch
toward the ideal margin. The modern legal realist does not think that any
coherent rules underlie the articulation of proximate cause rules once we move
8
9
beyond the clear case of trespasses, a conclusion with which I disagree.
What is true of private individuals facing state regulation is equally true of
governments facing constitutional restraint. Some legislation does improve the
state of the world, measured against a baseline that looks to either the state of
nature (and the war of all against all) or even to the distribution of rights as
articulated and defined, not by nature, but by common law courts that follow the
natural law theories of John Locke. It is therefore useful to begin by showing

6 See, e.g., the explication of the Lex Aquilia (Justinian’s Digest, IX, 2), found in F.H. Lawson,
Negligence in the Civil Law (1950). For an argument about how the same techniques carry over to
constitutional interpretation, see Richard A. Epstein, “A Common Lawyer Looks at Constitutional
Interpretation,” 72 Bost. U. L. Rev. 699 (1992).
7 For the classical exposition of the doctrine of equivalents, see Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., v. Linde
Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950): “To temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from
stealing the benefit of the invention,” a patentee may invoke the doctrine of equivalents against
the producer of a device “if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to obtain the same result.” For an update, see Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
8 See, e.g., Wex Malone, “Cause in Fact,” 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60 (1956).
9 See Richard A. Epstein, Torts § 10.11 (1999).
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how a well-ordered state could use legislation to improve overall social welfare,
and then to indicate when that mission is likely to founder.
In dealing with these issues, we have to consider two separate types of
property regimes, each with its own structural weakness. Crudely speaking, we
can divide property into two classes. Private property owned and held by one or
more individuals for his (or their) exclusive benefit and use. Public property is
held by the government for the benefit of the public it both governs and serves:
the government entity could be a town, a state, or the national government, each
with its own special constituency. In both of these settings, government can
introduce legal rules to alter the underlying patterns of use, either individual or
collective. The most obvious target for government use and regulation are public
lands, such as highways and parks. It is easy for the state to open up some roads
to general use, or to close them down; to allow for camping, while precluding
hunting and fishing. Assets in the public domain also include intellectual
property once the protection of the patent and copyright laws have run out. To
understand the difficulties in controlling faction, it is useful to examine how
government acquires and regulates both private and public property. It is also
critical to pay special attention to the legal mechanisms used to secure the
transition of property from private to public hands, or the reverse.
II. State Regulation of Private Property
In analyzing the role of private property, I shall take an unabashed
consequentialist attitude, which asks whether government action or intervention
improves the overall level of social utility by combating factional behavior.
Stating the proposition in this form, however, raises one of the thorniest
problems of property law, for societies, as complex aggregates of individuals , do
not have “utility” as such. Utility is a measurement that can be attached solely to
the well-being of human (or perhaps other sentient) beings. The only safe way to
advance social welfare is by adopting government projects that advance the
overall position of each group member, where utility is determined by his own
estimation of the situation, and not by the estimation of some outsider.
But what of the distribution of the gains through collective social action? Two
variations on the basic theme come quickly to mind. In the first, the government
uses coercion to produce all winners and no losers in settings where private
transactions could not achieve the same outcome. The intellectual case for
consequentialism rests on one simple proposition: no one could object in principle
to using force to obtain that new state of affairs even if the government practice
did violate some libertarian norm of autonomy or property. One manifestation of
this proposition relates to basic social contract theory that improves upon the
state of nature. The legal regime requires everyone to surrender some liberty of
action but imposes like restrictions on the actions of others. All persons value the
increased (bodily) security more than the loss of initial liberty. If their initial
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positions are identical, then no cash compensation is required, which now
becomes the source of administrative waste. Properly executed, this system
moves to a higher state of utility by overcoming the full panoply of holdout and
bargaining problems that frequently thwart voluntary exchanges. The conceptual
problems set in when different individuals receive differential gains, such that
while all are better off than before, some are more so than others. In these
nonprorata situations, the hard question asks whether it is appropriate to seek to
equalize the gains from the government action, or better to simply let matters
10
lie?
The second situation arises when government action in and of itself generates
an outcome with some winners and some losers. Now the soil is ripe for factional
discord. For example, a given plot of land is taken from one person for a
highway that operates for the benefit of all. Although the state action produces
many winners, it still leaves one loser—the owner of the taken parcel—even if he
shares in the benefits the road provides. Converting a “most win/one loses” into
an “all/win” situation ideally requires a side-payment from general revenues.
Those called upon to pay are better off with access to the public improvement
less their fractional tax burden. The individual whose property is taken is better
off with the compensation received for the loss of the property, plus his pro rata
share of the gain from access to the improvement in question. The key point is
that side payments are meant to insure that the overall gains are now evenly
distributed throughout the group. Ideally, we seek a program of government
exactions and private payments that results in some level of lockstep
improvement for all persons involved in the system. The execution of program
offers an effective antidote to the risks of faction. No one will propose a program
that has overall negative consequences, because the putative winners would not
pay the exactions needed to leave the losers at least indifferent to the adoption of
the new project.
In analyzing these issues, I have long advocated looking at the world as
containing two pies. The inner pie contains the rights that all individuals have to
their liberty and property in a world in which the state imposes no collective
exactions to preserve entitlements. The larger circle arises when taxation and
regulation, imposed at some cost, enables government to help prevent private
incursions by one citizen on his neighbor. Ideally all uses of government force
should try, within the limits of the possible, to expand each piece of the pie
without altering the relative share from the prior distribution. That condition is
imposed in order to supply a focal point that limits the potential scope of faction.
The prospect of a nonprorata division of gain could invite factional competition
over surplus sufficient to dissipate the surplus created by government action.
For my longish discussion of this issue, see Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State
(1993), which examines the distribution of gains from projects that government ought to
undertake.
10
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III. Obstacles to a Coherent Takings Law
The major challenge to this system stems from the high administrative costs
needed to make it work. In the worst scenario, the administrative costs of
arrangement forced exchanges exceed the potential gains. In those circumstances
any effort to achieve a stable distribution of gains makes it unwise to undertake
the project in the first place. Yet ignoring the compensation requirement has the
unfortunate effect of inviting government initiatives that do not meet even the
hypothetical compensation requirement. The hard task therefore is to fashion
rules of eminent domain that work their way between the horns of this dilemma.
I am sufficiently skeptical about the practical success of the constitutional
program of forced exchanges to favor a sharp curtailment of the eminent domain
process even when full compensation is paid. A complete analysis of the problem
identifies three potential sources of government abuse. The first concerns
occasions on which state coercion is exercised. The second concerns the level of
compensation paid for the loss of a private right. The third, and novel concern,
examines the use of the taking power that removes the property holder from the
community altogether. I take these up in order.
A. The uses and dangers of government coercion
The standard constitutional model allows government to proceed in two
separate ways in dealing with its citizens. First, it may enter into the voluntary
market whereby it purchases the inputs it needs from various suppliers by
contract. If the government needs to acquire land for new construction, or to buy
or lease existing facilities, it may do so by entering the voluntary market like
anyone else. Indeed, most of the specific assets needed for government
operations are acquired in just this fashion, for usually it is easier and cheaper to
buy property than to unleash the coercive power of the state. Eminent domain
proceedings take time; litigation is costly, even for government. Why fight a legal
war if a voluntary transaction reaches the appropriate outcome more quickly and
cheaply?
Frequently, however, voluntary markets fail. A highway cuts through the
land of multiple landowners, any one of whom could block its completion. Here
the coercive power of eminent domain meets the holdout problem that would
allow a single landowner to stop the transcontinental railroad. Just this situation
militates against abolishing the eminent domain power altogether. Given this
objective of the Takings Clause, a proper compensation formula could not award
the landowner the holdout value derivable from the proposed railroad use: why
then have the clause at all?
Analytically, it is helpful to distinguish between two components of the
increments beyond market value: subjective or unique values to this landowner,
and holdout value. In principle, all subjective values from current use should be
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compensable in order to improve the odds that the use of government coercion
11
will only result in win/win treatment. In contrast, the proper response to the
holdout values is far more problematic. The mere implementation of a takings
program has as its raison d’être the elimination of the holdout position. It follows
therefore that no sensible system of takings law could allocate all the surplus
from condemnation to the private owner. It hardly follows, however, that none
of it should be so allocated after all subjective and nonmarket values are taken
into account. But the effort to figure out how much of that surplus should be so
allocated requires some judicial determination of what that surplus is—no mean
feat when multiple plots of land must be assembled to complete a single project.
On balance therefore a respectable case supports the conclusion that all surplus
over highest subjective or use value goes to the government.
Once those subjective values are ignored, then institutionally, government
behavior will take advantage of the background legal rules. The eminent domain
power thus allows the state to push hard so that the landowner will take a price
which is greater than he would have gotten through condemnation (net of
expenses) but lower than he would have taken in any voluntary exchange. The
risk of faction remains evident. Yet the law offers no obvious doctrinal protection
that allows landowners to push back against these government threats.
At this point, it is useful to identify a second possible source of government
abuse in dealing with voluntary transactions: coercion that combines the implicit
threat of condemnation with breach of existing obligations to the targeted
landowner. Once again the same analytical framework applies to both public and
private forms of coercion. As a general matter of contract law, the opportunities
for coercion are far greater when two parties are linked together in some ongoing
relationship than when they deal as strangers. To be sure, naked coercion, such
as guns, could be used to obtain promises, property, or both, in either type of
setting. But one stratagem, which cannot be invoked in stranger cases, is
available in the context of ongoing relationships: the calculated refusal to
perform obligations that have already been undertaken. The point has been well
understood since Roman times in connection with a doctrine known, then as
12
now, as duress of goods.
Let us suppose that I leave my cloths to be cleaned with the tailor for an
agreed upon price of $10. It is also understood that the value to me of getting
back the clean garments on time is $100 because of some important social
For discussion, see infra at section C, pp. 15–18.
For one class account, see John Dawson, “Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective,” 45
Mich. L. Rev. 253-290 (1947); for my views, see Richard A. Epstein, “Unconscionability: A Critical
Reappraisal,” 18 J. Law & Econ. 293 (1975). See also, Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, and
Armen Alchian, “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting
Process,” 21 J. Law & Econ. 297 (1978).
11
12
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engagement. What should I do if the tailor refuses to return the clean garments
unless I pay a $50 charge (perhaps dressed up, falsely, as a claim for additional
unanticipated expenses). If the tailor had demanded that $50 up-front, I could
have taken my business elsewhere. But now that he possesses the goods, a
competitive situation has been transformed into a monopoly holdout problem,
where my humble tailor holds all the cards. Given the value of the garments,
there is little if anything that I could do to persuade him to accept less than the
inflated charges since he can simply hold on, and in the end resell the garments
which are worth more than the $50 claimed.
If this scenario is correct, however, then why do we not see it played out all
the time? One reason is that the law offers a remedy so that the extra money
could be paid over and then recovered in suit, no matter what disclaimers have
been provided. But in most cases the surer protection comes from social context.
The tailor has multiple customers and depends on repeat business. Pull a stunt
like this a single time, and those continuing relations will vanish like smoke into
thin air. The tailor knows this risk, so that this ploy will be tried, if at all,
sparingly, and often in disguise. But once again the amounts in question are
usually too small to justify the effort necessary to pull of a scheme of this sort.
The ability to use this form of duress, then, depends on (1) the negative
reputational fallout to third parties, (2), the potential gains from the maneuver,
(3) the potential for retaliation by other parties similarly situated with the target,
(4) and the ability of potential targets to obtain relief through the legal system. In
repeat commercial settings, factors (1) and (3) militate against the practice, and
13
they are supported in large transactions by the legal system. The risks of these
holdout games are, moreover, far greater in contexts without repeat dealing and
the reputational constraints that come from dealing with multiple customers. It is
not surprising therefore that holdout games of this sort can be played, for
example, at some peril by small landowners who own that single plot of land
14
necessary to complete the site for a large office building. (All this does not
guarantee that the strategy will work: go one step too far and the entire project
can be canceled or relocated, at which point the gains from holding out plummet
to zero, while the considerable costs of negotiation still remain.)
The great danger of government coercion comes precisely because the threat
of breach is not effectively constrained by market forces. In this regard, those of
us with eastern and city backgrounds do not understand well the drama that is
often played out on western lands, but as a regular reader of email missives from

Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971) (holdup on delivery on
components needed to fulfill navy procurement contract).
14 For a discussion of the risks, see Lloyd Cohen, “Holdouts and Freeriders,” 20 J. Legal Stud.
351 (1991).
13
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15

the American Land Rights Network, I have now gotten quite a different view of
the overall situation. Very little is gleaned from the title “American Land Rights
Network,” because land is not part of any network. But the title of its sister
organization, “The National Inholders Associations,” has more descriptive bite.
An inholding is privately-held land surrounded by government lands. Access to
private inholdings has to take place over government lands. In the analogous
private context, the courts will sometimes create easements by implication or
necessity for the benefit of the landlocked parcel.16 But in virtually voluntary
transactions, the inholders can protect themselves from blockade by acquiring
explicit rights of way over the surrounding property.
Nonetheless many complications lurk when good will toward inholders does
not lubricate these transactions. The protection of rights of way and other forms
of easements (such as those needed to install and maintain phone lines or
electrical wires) only looks easy from a distance. It becomes far more complex
when observed up close. Defining and enforcing the content of these rights is
never easy, even for parties who act in good faith. What looks like an easement
ends up being an incomplete treaty between two warring tribes. Suppose that the
easement calls for the use of some dirt road. Exactly what kind of vehicles can be
brought over the road? If the inholder needs to haul in heavy equipment to
construct a house on the inholding, does that fall within or beyond the scope of
the easement? If the inholder occasionally deviates from the easement, does that
allow the government to shut it down? To collect damages? If the inholder needs
to repair a wash in the road from a summer storm, to cut down weeds that
overgrown the path, or to remove snow and ice during winter, is he allowed to
do so? Or must he request that the government take action, and sue if they do
not? If allowed to take action, at what time and under what government
supervision? What should be done if the same easement services several
different inholders who need to coordinate their activities? If the government
needs to take out one road for one of its own improvements, can it require the
inholder to take a more circuitous and bumpy route in exchange?
These examples can be multiplied ad infinitum, but the analytics of each of
these examples boils down to one critical issue. The inholder is in the position of
the customer without the reputational protection; the government is in the
position of the tailor without the reputational constraints. It may be quite
impossible for the government to condemn out the easement (without having to
pay for the loss of value of the inholding), but it is certainly possible to make life
miserable for the inholder in the day-to-day use of the easement. Squabbles of
each and every one of these and other issues can take place on a daily basis,
where the government takes the position that any violation of its conditions
E-mail: alra@pacifer.com; http://www.landrights.org.
Again, the basic problem is apparent even when the surrounding land is owned by another
private party. See, e.g., Othen v. Rosier, 148 Tex. 485, 226 S.W.2d 622 (1950).
15
16
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makes the inholder into a trespasser, subject to damage actions and injunctions.
Here the government has little reason to worry about reputational concerns—
and indeed its tough-nosed attitude could win the favor of many
environmentalists who favor the expansion of private inholdings. The stakes
could be quite large, and the ability to retaliate sharply limited since the
government typically does not hold easements over the private inholdings in
question.
The upshot is that the government can use low-level forms of coercion—that
is low-level continuous breach of the express and implied conditions associated
with the right of way—to wear down the resistance of the individual inholder.
Once that softening-up takes place, then it becomes possible to acquire the land
in a “voluntary” transaction, of course, for a small fraction of the value that it
would have commanded if the rights of way and other easements had been
scrupulously respected. Quite simply, the inholdings become the focal point of a
guerrilla war between inholders and government, where the latter holds most of
the high cards.
At this point, the line between voluntary and coercive transactions becomes
murky to say the least. Litigation, like drama, works best when there is one
defining incident (an accident, a bankruptcy), but far less well with a long and
sinuous set of low-level events, each of which lends itself to conflicting
interpretations. To give but one example, it may well be possible to prevent a
township from downzoning land that it promptly condemns based on its
17
reduced value. The one discrete act becomes a sensible focal point for litigation.
Yet just as guerrilla wars rarely have decisive confrontations, so too it is hard to
bring these tug-of-wars between government and inholders to closure given the
stream of continuous incursions by both sides. In these cases, therefore, the
precarious nature of the inholders rights leads to a major inroad (no pun
intended) to the constitutional protections afforded to private property, for
which I see no obvious constitutional, legislative or judicial fix. The private,
voluntary sales reflect the reduced values of the current holdings and the bleak
prospects in a condemnation proceeding.

17 See, e.g, Riggs v. Township of Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601, 538 A.2d 808 (1988). the defendant
Township, which had long been desirous of purchasing Rigg’s land, downzoned the property by
increasing the minimum lot size for building from 5,000 square feet to 10,000 square feet. It
purported to justify this amendment by the need to preserve open space, control population
density, and prevent urban sprawl. Even though the New Jersey Court gave that zoning
ordinance a presumption of validity, it looked through the township’s ostensible police power
objectives and struck down the ordinance saying: “The purpose of the zoning amendment was
not to fulfill the master plan, but to enable the municipality to pay the property owner less than
fair market value under the preexisting zoning ordinance.” Id at 615, 538 A.2d at 815. That
approach is in principle available in the inholding case, but far harder to achieve because of the
absence of a precipitating event like the downzoning in Riggs.
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This gap in the enforcement mechanism translates itself into a degradation of
18
constitutional rights. Any systematic effort to contain the abuse cuts too deeply
into the system of ordinary ownership. First, even a prohibition against forced
exchanges would not respond to the difficulties involved here. Nor would any
prohibition against government purchases work either, for the close substitutes
still remains: the pressure can be placed on the inholder until the land is sold to a
third party that shares the government’s vision of how the inholding should be
used. And to prevent the sale of private inholdings categorically will insure that
with time all these interests will be abandoned. So the problem remains an open
wound at the boundary line between public and private property, one that
increases the likelihood that government coercion will produce the factional gain
that Madison feared.
B. Calculating just compensation
The second source of concern with the current takings model is that the just
compensation owed in takings case is not correctly computed. Here the point
matters not only for litigated cases, but also for cases settled in the shadow of the
law. At this point, however, the problem is not one of the asymmetric risk of
confiscation by littles. Rather, it is in the choice of improper legal standards by
which the just compensation is determined.
The nub of the difficulty comes in an unexpected place, the ostensibly
exacting requirement, first announced in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United
19
States, in which lavish praise for the takings clause is followed by its narrow
interpretation. On the former issue, the Court makes clear that one key uses of
the clause is that
it prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his just
share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to
the public something more and different from that which is exacted from
other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to
20
him.

18 Note, too, in principle it is possible for the exploitation to run in the opposite direction,
whereby landowners make successive low-level incursions onto public lands. But to that point,
there are several responses. The first, and most obvious, is that two wrongs do not make a right.
Individuals who violate these laws should be prosecuted for their offenses. Yet even here, it is not
clear that the inholders are the violators, and it is clear that the government is in a far better
position to prosecute violations of public lands against and ordinary citizen, than the citizen is in
suing the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. or its state law
counterpart, which contains substantial protection for government actions including the exercise
of discretionary functions, applicable “whether or not the discretion be abused.” 28 U.S.C. §
2680(a).
19 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893)
20 Id. at 325-326.
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But the judicial follow-through falls short:
There can, in view of the combination of those two words [just
compensation], be no doubt that the compensation must be a full and
perfect equivalent for the property taken. And this just compensation, it
21
will be noticed, is for the property, and not to the owner.
As explicated, the object of compensation is “to put the owner of condemned
property ‘in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been
22
taken.” In principle, that measure might allow (depending on the reading of
“pecuniarily”) compensation for subjective values associated with the property—
but these are difficult to measure. As a corrective against possible abuse,
hornbook law provides that “the owner is entitled to receive ‘what a willing
buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller’ at the time of the taking.”23 As such it
does not provide any scheduled bonus value to condemnees for any subjective
use value.24 It does, however, allow for the possibility of compensation for future
use values, which the landowner is under a burden to establish. 25
These legal standards are symptomatic of a larger ill. Monongahela’s use of
the phrase “property taken” narrows compensation in light of what follows, that
the compensation is only for the property taken, not for the loss of the owner
consequent on that taking. In its restrictive formulation, the compensation rule
does not make sufficient accommodation for the collateral or consequential losses
that government action imposes on private landowners. To see why, compare
that formula with the objective for compensation identified by Blackstone in
explaining how the state takes private land for public use: “Not by absolutely
stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a
full indemnification and equivalent of the injury thereby sustained.”26
Monongahela ignores this element of subjective value, i.e. the amount above
market value attached to the subject property. There is a good reason why “for
sale” signs do not sprout from every front lawn in the United States. In a wellordered society most individuals are content with their personal living or
business situations. They do not put their property up for sale because they do
not think that there is any other person out there who is likely to value it for a
Id. at 326; see also, United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)
23 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979), quoting United States v. Miller,
317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
24 See Robert C. Ellickson, “Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as
Land Use Controls,” 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 736-737 (1973).
25 See Jan G. Laitos, The Law of Property Rights Protection: Limitations on Government Powers, §
17.03[C], noting that both present and future uses can be considered, with the presumption set so
that the owner must establish the value of some future use, which might involve the removal of
some current valid land use regulation.
26 1. W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 135 (1765).
21
22
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sum greater than they do. In the normal case, use value is greater than exchange
27
value, so the property is kept off the market. The use of the market value
standard therefore results in a situation in which the party who owns the
property, even if he shares in the social gain generated by the project, is still left
worse off than his peers. He is forced to sacrifice the subjective values associated
with his property, values which almost by definition he could not recreate
through his next best use of the funds received, even if he could negotiate a
second set of transaction costs. In contrast, the Blackstone definition seems to
include loss of subjective value as part of “the injury thereby sustained.”
The current law, however, follows Monongahela. In Kimball Laundry v. United
28
States, Justice Frankfurter offered this rationale:
The value of property springs from subjective needs and attitudes; its
value to the owner may therefore differ widely from its value to the taker.
Most things, however, have a general demand which gives them a value
transferable from one owner to another. As opposed to such personal and
variant standards as value to the particular owner whose property has
been taken, this transferable value has an external validity which makes it
a fair measure of public obligation to compensate the loss incurred by an
owner as a result of the taking of his property for public use. In view,
however, of the liability of all property to condemnation for the common
good, loss to the owner of nontransferable values deriving from his
unique need for property or idiosyncratic attachment to it, like loss due to
an exercise of the police power, is properly treated as part of the burden of
common citizenship.”29
Frankfurter thus takes the view that the questions of valuation are always
more difficult than the dangers from inappropriate government behaviors. His
position stems from his clear pro-government bias that led to his constitutional
blessing to all New Deal legislation. His position further presupposes that in all
cases the subjective value depends on some peculiar and obscure landowner
preference. But in many cases the subjective value attaches to a well-documented
idiosyncratic use that cannot be replicated by others because they lack, for
example, a special license or connection to engage in the task. At this point the
unwillingness to sell provides in itself powerful evidence that current use value
27 Remember that all prospective buyers do have the option of buying from those individuals
who do wish to sell, that is, from the small segment which finds use value lower than sale value.
As sale prices move upward, the fraction that cross this line may well increase, just as the number
of buyers may be similarly reduced until the market comes back into equilibrium. In this
connection it is useful to note that it is often regarded as somewhat bizarre behavior to knock on
someone’s door and to offer him then and there a price far in excess of market value, although
that does happen in some overheated markets.
28 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949) (per Frankfurter, J.)
29 Id. at 5.
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exceeds transferable value, often in ways that can be objectively measured. Yet
the bias in favor of government action, all in the name of the duties of common
citizenship, could lead to erroneous but easily monitored decisions. Note that
Kimball Laundry itself involved the temporary condemnation of the owner’s
laundry facilities that resulted in the dissipation of his good will, which was held
not compensable, because not transferred to, and hence taken by, the United
States.
Similar shortfalls can be detected with consequential damages and collateral
30
losses. The individual who is forced to surrender property has to enter into an
involuntary transaction with the government, one that requires him to expend
resources to contest the condemnation (or valuation) itself; to move his personal
belongings off his property, and to reestablish his personal relationships or
business good will after the move has taken place. Thus in one case, state safety
regulations prohibited the physical transfer of prescription drugs from one
location to another unless they were reinspected for purity. The required tests
31
cost more than the drugs themselves were worth. Blackstone’s test requires full
compensation for the losses sustained when the drugs were rendered worthless.
But the California State Supreme Court denied compensation under the
Monongahela formulation because the government had not “taken” the drugs,
but had only “destroyed” their value by regulation. The cleavage between what
the state has gained and the individual has lost is thus enormous. In the usual
private law case, the innocent tort plaintiff always recovers his loss even if it is
greater than the cost to the wrongdoer. But the takings law, which supposedly
seeks to put the plaintiff back in the position that he enjoyed before the taking,
does not.
The same difficulties attach to the loss of locational good will generally, as in
Kimball Laundry. The government wants the land, but it cannot use the good will,
which the previous owner is “free” to take to the next location. But in some cases
it is not possible reestablish the business at all; in other cases it will require
additional expenditures of cash to inform customers of the change in location,
and even then some fraction of them will decide to change businesses because of
the added inconvenience of the new location.
A similar critique applies to the nebulous issue of “expectations”. A tenant on
a short term lease that has been renewed countless times in the past has the
positive expectation (say, 0.95) that the lease will be renewed on attractive terms
at the end of the next period, twelve months away. The potential surplus from
this lease, given his site-specific investments could be substantial. No matter, the
For my more extensive treatment of this subject, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 51-56 (1985).
31 Community Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles v. Abrams, 15 Cal. 3d 813, 543 P.2d 905, 126
Cal. Rptr. 473 (1975).
30
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case law is clear that his renewal right only counts as a mere “expectation” for
32
which no compensation is required when the government condemns the fee.
The expected value of the prospective relationship with the landlord was
positive, precisely because the ongoing relationship itself had proved sturdy on
multiple past occasions. The legal value attached to that relationship in
condemnation proceedings is, however, rounded off to zero.
Unfortunately, by refusing to compensate all those losses that flow from
government action, the takings ignores this fundamental precept: that the
compensation in question should leave the owner indifferent between the
property once possessed and the compensation tendered thereafter for its use.
The inequitable treatment, of course, leads to profound allocative distortions: the
lower prices stipulated by government lead to an excessive level of takings,
which in turn increases the size of government relative to what it should be, and
thereby alters for the worse the balance between public and private control. And
these problems remain even if (as per our general formulation) the individual
whose property has been taken shares in the public benefits generated by the
improvement in question. Following Blackstone, level of compensation should be
beefed up to cover subjective value and consequential damages except in those
few cases where the problems of proof are genuinely daunting. But in light of the
determined judicial resistance to that position, it is not likely that this reform will
be achieved any time quickly.
C. Division of the surplus
The third question associated with governmental takings is more subtle
perhaps, but of greater importance in some important institutional settings. One
categorical proposal is that the government just ought to stay out of the takings
business altogether: the danger of abuse is so great that we are in effect better off
33
without a clear response to the holdout problem. Constitutionally, that position
has a faint echo in the public use provision of the takings clause which in effect
delineates a class of takings (those for private use) for which the government
power cannot be exercised at all. It is easy to see why everyone regards it as an
abuse of power for the state to take land from A to convey it B, where both A and
B are ordinary private parties. Unfortunately, even this strategy is routinely
tolerated by the United States Supreme Court. In Hawaiian Housing Authority v.
Midkiff34 the Supreme Court sustained a scheme whereby the Hawaiian Housing
Authority would purchase leasehold reversions from their owners and then, by
prearrangement, resell them to the tenant in possession (and even here, there
was some monkey-business in the valuation of the reversions). But before the
state would engage in the condemnation it required the landowner to place the
United States v. Petty Motors, 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
See Ellen Frankel Paul, Property Rights and Eminent Domain (1987).
34 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
32
33
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needed funds in escrow so that it could not be caught in a bind. The state thus
took no business risk at all, but simply acted as a purchasing agent for the
private holder of the property. It was not as though the land afterwards was
devoted to public use. It did not go into public hands, and the landowner did not
(as is the case with common carriers and many public establishments) allow the
public to use it as it would. The property was as private in the hands of the new
owners as it had been in the hands of the old ones.
The transaction represents a close substitute for the private taking that cries
out for judicial nullification. Yet the Supreme Court upheld this transparent piece
of derring-do on the ground that any “conceivable public use” would do, thus
implying the low-scrutiny of the rational basis test to yet another constitutional
provision. It then held that the oligopolistic structure of the land market justified
the use of state power, even though most of Hawaiian lands are zoned to prevent
any real estate development. Even if the land was not taken for a public use, the
entire scheme was designed for some public purpose, albeit one that bears no
relation to Madison’s anti-factional program. It is doubtful, however, that the
two particularistic features of this case (the holding of the reversion, and the
large concentration of ownership in the Bishop Estate) count in any sense
rigorous preconditions for the use of state power. Any political-charged action
carries with it multiple consequences—some good, some bad—and it takes only
a little imagination to point to one public consequence that could “conceivably”
justify the use of legislative power. The broad use of the takings power certainly
leads to a deviation from the social ideal to which forced exchanges should be
addressed.
The larger question with regard to the public use requirement raises more
profound difficulties because it arises with takings that meet any sensible
definition of the public use test: the taking of lands for uses made available to
everyone in the world. Here the problem is well illustrated by contrasting two
different takings for public use. In the first, A owns a piece of land which is taken
in its entirety for inclusion in the public park. In the second, B owns a piece of
land, a strip of which is taken for use as a public highway that abuts his property.
In both cases the state pays full and fair compensation for the land, taking into
account subject value and collateral losses, just as Blackstone would have it.
Under the current takings law, these two situations are treated alike: the state has
met the full constitutional obligations in a world with forced exchanges.
Under the basic model set out above, the social and economic consequences
of these two takings differ profoundly. In the highway case, there are no
economic forebodings about the constitutional regime that is put into place. The
owner gets both direct losses and shares in the social gains from the public
project. Indeed, the increased value from the retained lands often proves far
greater than the value of original plot (without road access). The owner who
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surrenders the strip to the public free of charge is better off, so long as the state
would commit itself to the extensive resources it takes to erect, maintain, and
police a public road. It is for that reason that local communities often go into
competition with each other to have state or national roads located near enough
to them to secure favorable access, even if they would like, at least for residential
properties in some urban settings, to have narrow buffer zone to insulate
35
themselves from the noise and congestion associated with their operation. We
can therefore be confident that even in the best of circumstances some of the
benefits of public roads will be competed away as parties vie to secure the
optimal placement of these roads from their own local perspective. Once again,
we see the risk of faction. Yet it seems that no manipulation of the compensation
system could eliminate this source of social loss.
The second situation with the wholesale condemnation of land for public
parks, however, carries with it much more dire consequences. The standard
model of eminent domain indicates that the landowner receives two sources of
benefit from the taking: the direct compensation for the land taken (which as
noted, is usually calculated too low) and his pro rata share of the overall gains
from the public project undertaken with the property so taken. But once state
expropriation extends to the entire property of a given landowner, that second
element of value is completely eliminated. All other individuals who remain in
that community (or perhaps who enter thereafter) share pro rata in the gains.
The party who loses his full holdings to the taking, however, loses both ways
relative to his peers: inadequate compensation and no share of the social surplus.
It is for just this reason that the land acquisition battles that take place in the
West are fought at such a pitched level. On the one side stand the
conservationists who claim that large public appropriations should be directed to
the acquisition of sensitive parcels of land (including those pesky inholdings) in
order to preserve the natural condition of the land “forever.” On the other side
lie the beleaguered and outnumbered members of small farming and ranching
communities who see in the appropriation of public moneys for land acquisition
a deadly plot to destroy their lives and their livelihoods. The battle here is not
36
dissimilar in form to those extensive urban renewal programs that led to the
35 Here the usual pattern is that the negative externalities from nearby highways decline quite
rapidly with an increase in distance, while the positive externality of good access declines far
more slowly. It is quite possible therefore that communities would seek to block the construction
of roads that are quite close, but welcome them if located a mile away. Thus in Los Angeles, the
Santa Monica and San Diego Freeways are both located near to but not in Beverly Hills.
36 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,
410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981). For an account of the systematic failure that resulted in
Washington D.C. from the urban renewal plan sustained in Berman, see James V. Delong, XXX,
The New Republic (about five years ago). The actual consequences contrast sharply with Justice
Douglas’s optimistic rhetoric about government land use planning that led to the expansion of the
public use requirement
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wholesale destruction of neighborhoods in the name of urban renewal, most of
which never quite took place. Right now, a parallel struggle is taking place over
37
the question of the passage of the Conservation and Reinvestment Act (CARA),
which proposes to take some royalty revenues the Land and Water Conservation
Fund and direct it toward the acquisition of public lands. As might be expected,
the political battles over this appropriation legislation are fierce. Yet if the benign
version of the eminent domain paradigm worked, then one should see little, if
any, concentrated opposition to the proposed expansion. If the level of
compensation made the condemnees indifferent between the lands that they held
and the compensation that they received, then why would they spend huge
private resources to ward off a set of takings whose consequences they truly
dread? From the ground level, they have made the considered judgment that
they are worse off by far from the takings with compensation, and the
explanation lies, I think, in the three factors outlined above. Many of the
voluntary purchases have been brought about by the constant tussles over rights
of way and similar easements; the level of compensation offered is below the true
costs of losing the land; and the public benefits, however defined, are not shared
by the individuals who are forced out of the communities in which they live.
The consequences are quite sobering. Whatever the theoretical promise of the
taking property only with compensation, that gain has been nullified in large
measure by the troubled circumstances of its application. It is difficult to know
how to fix the situation, although it seems clear that we should try to limit the
incidence of forced exchanges to those holdout situations that justify its
application. But here again, the question of what counts as a holdout or blockade
is more difficult in practice that it is in theory, once we move away from the
single foot of land that blocks the completion of a railroad between two towns.
Does the typical inholder, for example, stand as a holdout against the
government control of certain undeveloped lands? Surely if the goal is to keep
public ownership of all contiguous property, each inholder counts a potential
holdout. But if it is asked what gains the government obtains from acquisition,
one would be hard pressed to find gains comparable to those of the completed
railroad. The basic insight is that the takings power works best to weave the
threads of infrastructure—highways, railroads, telephone easements, rivers and
the like—and not for squarish plots of land used for other purposes. But what
ratio and what set of uses determines what counts as thread and what as a
square? It is hard question, for which there is no easily administrable answer.
The upshot, however, is that all distortions cut in the same direction, so that in
equilibrium there is too much public, and too little, private land.

37
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IV. The Regulation of Public Property
A. Concurrent Ownership as the Analogue to Public Property
The second half of the governance problem is every bit as intractable as the
first, and perhaps more so. A well-ordered society does not have only private
property. Rather, it will contain certain elements that are regarded as held in
common by the public at large, so much so that these elements cannot be reduced
38
to private ownership by either occupation or capture. From the earliest times,
the air and the sea have been regarded as part of the ius communis, which meant
that it was open to all. In addition, the state routinely uses its eminent domain
power or ordinary market transactions to acquire private property for use in
roads and other forms of public works.
With that thumbnail sketch in place, it is possible to identify discordant
rationales for treating certain resources as publicly owned. Certain things are
treated as public property in the initial position in order to mount an effective
social response to a holdout problem. In riparian systems, the privatization of
public waters ends their use for transportation and destroys the aesthetic
amenities of running river. The customary practice of keeping these waters open
to all yields on average higher values than any decision to allow their partition
under the rule of capture. The decision to treat these resources as part of the
commons therefore represents a good effort to minimize the sum of the costs of
exclusion and coordination. No one has exclusive ownership, but everyone has (a
right of) access to the veins and arteries that link separate plots of (privately
39
owned) land—or for that matter, water —together. That same position requires
some modification for highways, for unlike water, their location is not given in
nature, but requires collective human choice. In contrast, when the road has to be
created out of privately held lands, compensation (in cash or kind) is supplied to
limit, and perhaps prevent, the arbitrary use of state power.
The second class of public property covers resources that are not part of some
complex network arrangement. The lands in question may be operated, for
example, as a public park. As noted earlier, that land may have been successfully
owned in private hands, so that its public acquisition cannot be justified as part
of a plan to complete some transportation or communication network. How
should individual rights, if any, be assigned to property of this sort?

For a discussion of the commons questions, see Richard A. Epstein, Principles for a Free
Society: Reconciling Individual Liberty with the Common Good ch. 9 (1998). The historical rules are set
out with clarity in Justinian’s Institutes, Book II, Title I.
39 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (finding a taking where the United
States demanded public access to a private marina as a condition for allowing access from the
marina to public waters).
38

HP

July 6, 2001

19

The first point to note is that this problem is not unique to property that is
held in common in the public sphere. One common institution in the private law
is that property may be held by multiple owners in common, with or without
rights of survivorship. The practical difficulty arises because all of the tenants,
taken together, do have exclusive rights to the property as against the rest of the
world, but none of the tenants individually have exclusive rights against their
cotenants. The problems of internal governance are at least as important as the
right to exclude, which all the cotenants taken together hold as against the rest of
40
the world.
The institution of joint ownership usually works best between husband and
wife because of the close parallelism of their objectives. But this body of private
law does not respond well to nonprorata shifts in the patterns of use of the land
which redistribute wealth between the parties. Thus when jointly owned land is
leased to a single tenant, it is easy to divide the net rentals between the two
cotenants, both of whom are out of possession. But matters become considerably
more difficult when the two tenants no longer have prorata stakes in the
property revenues. Thus a constant source of tension arises when one of two
joint tenants takes sole possession of the property, which in general he is allow to
do on a rent-free basis.41 The party out-of-possession is thus relegated to the
costly choice of seeking either partition or judicial sale. Likewise, the rules of
joint tenancy have certain slack when one of two joint tenants in possession
wishes to change the character of part of the premises, add improvements, or to
42
lease part of them premises to someone who will. Again the vast shifts of
internal wealth undertaken by unilateral action are hard to cope with in any
systematic fashion, even by a system that seeks in general to honor and enforce
the respective shares of the two parties. Unavoidable redistributions among
cotenants thus take place within the private sector, even when courts treat each
cotenant as owning an aliquot portion of the whole. In order to respond to these
difficulties, the law often provides for some general accounting to take place at
the termination of the joint tenancy. The logic behind that decision is fairly
straightforward. It is quite costly for courts to intervene with the small decisions
in an ongoing relationship in which it is possible that the imbalance in one
transaction is offset by the opposite imbalance in another. But once the
relationship is terminated, the stakes become higher, and the prospects of
reciprocal advantages diminish. At this point a once-and-for-all accounting may

40 For a recent academic defense of the right to exclude as the central notion of property law,
see Thomas Merrill, “Property and the Right to Exclude,” 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730 (1998).
41 See, e.g., Spiller v. Mackereth, 334 So.2d 859 (Ala. 1976), for a case that requires a complete
ouster before the cotenant out of possession has a remedy short of partition against the party in
possession.
42 Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 54 P.2d 73 (Cal. App. 1936) (sustaining the cutting down of walnut
trees of leased portion of common premises).
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help redress some interim imbalance (as when the improvements paid for by one
are enjoyed by both), so that judicial interference becomes cost justified.
The legal position becomes only more attenuated when attention turns to
public or common property. To the extent that private property analogies
govern, public property should be treated as property held in common whereby
the people of the locality, state, or nation, have the collective right to exclude the
outsider, but share among themselves the rights in property as res communis.
Using this approach would require a court to work out in the constitutional
realm the nature of these shared access and use rights in ways that maximized
the internal coherence and minimized the indefiniteness of the multiple
ownership claims. The minimum condition for this venture is a rejection of the
idea that individual members of the public have no access or use rights to public
property at all. And in line with the joint tenancy, it would tend to focus judicial
intervention to transitional situations when publicly held property is transferred
to private hands.
Yet judicial thinking takes just the opposite view, chiefly by washing its
hands of any supervision over public property. Justice Scalia penned a forceful
but misguided statement of the basic proposition in College Saving Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board:
The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude
others. That is ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized.” That is why the right we all possess to the
use of the public lands is not the ‘property’ right of anyone — hence the
sardonic maxim, explaining what economists call the ‘tragedy of the
43
commons,’ res publica, res nullius .
The more accurate rendition of the point at hand should be res publica, res
communis. Unfortunately genuine consequences attach to the inapt choice of
Latin adjectives. The use of the term “nullius” implies that no one has any rights
to anything. One unfortunate implication of this rule is that it would allow any
person to take possession of the property in question, as with any other res
nullius. The strict prohibition of such actions shows that the term res nullius is
applied in an opportunistic fashion. More to the point, if public lands are
(selectively) conceived as res nullius, then any alteration or elimination of the
access rights of ordinary individuals may be done at will. So long as no legal
rights are taken, then no compensation need be tendered. But let these rights be
held in common, then their alteration could generate important consequences.

College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219,
2224 (1999).
43
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B. Res Nullius versus Res Communis
How then do we decide which of these conceptions make sense for common
property. Here we can take a leaf from the standard judicial methodology of
determining what counts as private property under the takings clause. One
possible approach is to allow the judges to determine what is meant by “private
property” when they engage in interpretation of the takings clause. But that
approach necessarily guts the clause by allowing the Supreme Court to deny the
honorific title of property to whatever private interest it chooses not to protect.
The only way to avoid this trap is to look outside the Constitution, typically to
state law, so as to piggyback on definitions of property that the judicial chefs did
not order up for the occasions.44 In general the Supreme Court has been aware of
the dangers of its excessive role, by taking the role of finder and not inventor of
property rights:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law —
rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
45
claims of entitlements to those benefits.
These are not idle words. In a wide variety of contexts dealing with asserted
claims to private property the Supreme Court will look to traditional bodies of
state law, particularly to long-standing common law rules that do not present the
prospect of legislative intrigue. To give but one example, in Monsanto v.
46
Ruckelshaus, the Court found that trade secrets were protectable property under
the Takings Clause, adopting verbatim their definition in Section 757 of the
Restatement of Torts.47

For a discussion of this approach, see Thomas Merrill, Constitutional Property (mss.)
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (finding no property interest for renewal of
one-year term contract).
46 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984).
47
b. Definition of a trade secret. A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern,
device, or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know
it. It may be a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or
preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device or a list of customers.
The topic of trade secrets was dropped from the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The newer
definition is found in Restatement Torts: Unfair Competition, § 39: “A trade secret is an information
that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable
and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.” It seems clear that
this definition was not meant to alter the earlier law, or to exclude from the coverage of trade
secrets any of the items listed in comment b of Restatement Torts § 757.
44
45
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What is striking is that this methodology is totally abandoned in working out
the definitions of common property under the Constitution. Two types of cases
illustrate the basic problem: water rights and public lands.
First, the common law of water rights has always involved a complex
48
division of rights among various claimants to the water. Riparians have rights
of access from the riverbanks and limited rights to use the water in question. The
public has the right to travel along navigable rivers. Different legal regimes
govern the capture of fish that swim in the river and mussels, claims and other
forms of sea life that burrow into the sand. Once these “usufructuary” rights are
established by custom, individuals receive legal protection against those who
would exclude them from the river or otherwise impair their rights. The fact that
rights are held in common in complex ways has never precluded the recognition
of private rights along the river. “For water is a moveable, wandering thing, and
must of necessity continue common by the law of nature; so that I can only have
a temporary, transient, usufructuary property therein: . . . “49 That said, the
riparian system guaranteed all riparians rights of access to the river (just as
landowners have rights of access to the roads). Yet a uniform line of Supreme
Court decisions has held that the all-consuming navigation servitude allows the
government to wipe out access rights without compensation.50 The traditional
versions of riparian rights give some relief against (unreasonable) interferences
with the operation of established dams, but a long line of Supreme Court cases
again holds that the heads of mills and power plants are not protected against
government action even though they are protected against the like action of
51
other riparians.
The same attitude toward rights has been expressed in relationship with
public lands. Thus in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,52 the
Supreme Court gave its blessing to a decision of the United States Forest Service
to build a road that cut through the sacred sites and burial grounds of three
Indian Tribes (the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa). The explanation was simple
enough: “Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area, however,
those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its
property.53 The counterargument rests on the view that customary practices that
48 For a convenient summary of the basic rules, see 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts 209-212
(1979).
49 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *18 (1766).
50 See, e.g., Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900); United States v. Commodore Park Inc., 324
U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967). For my more exhaustive critique, see
Richard A. Epstein, Takings at 67-73 (1985).
51 See, e.g, United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913) (power plant
on navigable river); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1944) (power plant at
junction of navigable and nonnavigable rivers).
52 485 U.S. 439 (1985).
53 Id. at 453 (italics in original).
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can create group rights even on private lands—in this case easements and other
prescriptive rights—that could be applied in accordance with the ordinary
54
common law definitions.
It is thus possible to identify two discordant principles for the constitutional
superintendence of public property: the first carries over the private rules of joint
ownership to government resources and uses them as a means to constrain
political action. The second treats public property as a res nullius and thus sees no
way to import constitutional constraints on political behavior. The total
withdrawal of constitutional principle from regulation of public property does
much to simplify the administrative burdens thrown on the judicial system. But
at the same time it does much to unleash a wide range of destructive political
forces.
The successful operation of joint ventures in the private sphere rests only in
part on the legal rules that govern conflicts of interest. Much more depends on
the ability of individuals to choose their business partners. That power of
selection can allow people to choose partners whom they trust, and partners who
have the same basic preference set. The first reduces the likelihood of illicit
appropriation of common assets. The second reduces the likelihood of major
standoffs on collective choice.
Neither of these protective mechanisms are available, however, with respect
to property that is held in public hands, for here the joint tenants are, as it were,
the citizens of a city, county, state or nation, as the case may be. They are thrown
together against their will, and operate in large and anonymous settings. The
element of trust among them may prove nonexistent, and their preference sets
are likely to diverge wildly from each other. Yet they must choose from a broad
spectrum of potential land uses, which can be mixed and matched with each
other.
By way of contrast, highways have single uses that are compatible with the
need to maintain the transportation network, and the prohibition on private uses
is driven by that one dominant objective. No one may, for example, construct a
permanent private improvement on public highways or waterways. Beaches in
54 As suggested in Ira C. Lupu, “Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free
Exercise of Religion,” 102 Harv. L. Rev. 933 (1989). It is no accident that Lupu uses the same test
that I have adopted in analyzing takings: “Whenever religious activity is met by intentional
government action analogous to that which if committed by a private party, would be actionable
under general principles of law, a legally cognizable burden on religion is present.” Id at 935, 966.
Thus compare his statement with the position I took in Takings:
On Lockean principles the government stands no better than the citizens it represents on
whether property has been taken, so a simple test determines, not the ultimate liability of
the government, but whether its actions are brought within the purview of the eminent
domain clause. Would the government action be treated as a taking of private property if
it had been performed by some private party?
Epstein, Takings, at 36.
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contrast have a somewhat broader spectrum of uses, and there the usual rule for
public beaches at least, is that private individuals may claim the exclusive right
to a limited portion of beach only for a short period of time, say between sunrise
and sunset. The beach chairs that mark a preferred location in the morning must
be all removed come evening. The next day the cycle starts anew on a beach that
by design has no history. On the Michigan beach that I frequent, the basic norm,
unspoken but strictly observed, is that only the owner of the adjacent land may
sit on his private portion of beach. Others may walk across the beach and collect
seashells, but they cannot stop and camp out in front of someone’s home without
his permission, which is usually denied to strangers. In effect the beach is a form
of mixed property—it is treated as common property with respect to movement,
but remains a form of limited private property with respect to occupation, which
itself is carefully circumscribed to beachfront owners. This partial commons
works because the mixed set of allowable uses generates maximum value at that
location. And no unilateral deviation in use patterns is tolerated which might
upset the initial equilibrium once it is obtained.
The moment, however, the state takes over the operation of a public park the
problem of choosing the use or mix of uses intensifies. In this context, however,
the situation is more perilous than it is with private property because the class of
citizen owners is likely to have widely divergent tastes which must be reconciled
over a very broad class of potential uses. In this context, the blockage of
permanent improvements can no longer be rationalized as a way to keep the
arteries of transportation open. If private owners may erect extensive
improvements on their lands, then why not a similar range of activities on public
property? The government is thus put into the position of having to decide on
who can make what kinds of uses of public lands, and also whether to sell or
lease all or part of these land to private individuals. The state can allow the
removal of minerals or oil and gas from private lands—through open bids or
sweetheart deals. It can dispose of certain lands that it does not need to ordinary
citizens—at public auction, or at bargain prices to the well-connected.
C. The Constitutional Oversight of Public Property
1. Gaps in the System. These government powers to regulate the use and
disposition of public lands are subject to precious little explicit constitutional
constraint. That indefiniteness of rights with respect to these assets greatly
influences the political behavior in disputes involving public lands and waters.
Large shifts in use patterns produce enormous shifts in implicit wealth. But since
the underlying assets stay in public solution both before and after the shift takes
place, no compensation is payable by any winner to any loser, which necessarily
blocks the standard technique for making win/lose transactions into win/win
transactions.
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The gaps in the current institutional arrangements become clear when we
apply the framework of analysis for private property to public property. In both
settings we ask two questions about any shift in either the ownership or use
patterns of public resources. The first is whether that shift results in some overall
net social gain in the value of the resources in question. The second is whether
those net gains are distributed in a fashion to all citizens to share in these public
improvements. Neither condition is frequently satisfied.
Let us start first with the question of the shift in uses of public lands. Suppose
for example that certain public lands have been left open for hunting and fishing.
A new administration comes into power and decides to ban these traditional
uses, or erect public roads that reduce the available amount of game, or construct
dams that alter or reduce the number of fish available for capture, or, as in Lyng,
build roads that cut through the sacred grounds of some Indian tribe. Each of
these changes will benefit powerful groups and harm less powerful groups. Yet
the usual method for dealing with massive distributional imbalances introduced
by government is not available, because no provision of any constitution, state or
federal, requires that any compensation be paid from winners to losers for the
shift in legislative programs. The upshot is that compensation, when it comes,
does so solely out of political compromise, where its amount is at best
imperfectly correlated with any sensible social objective.
This omission of compensation is entirely understandable from an
administrative perspective. Over a quarter of a billion people in the United States
have at least some rights of access with respect to the properties that are in public
solution. Any change in land use patterns will have no affect on large fractions of
them, but profound effects, both positive and negative, on substantial minorities.
Who then can determine who should pay how much to whom? To make matters
worse, public management decisions run into an acute “baseline” problem. Let
us suppose that the current regime of land uses allows extensive fishing and
hunting. Once these are curtailed or eliminated by public edict, should we
characterize that action as the rectification of a wrong done by some private
actors (the destruction of wildlife or its habitat) or should we treat it as though it
were the restriction on the common-law rights of all individuals to reduce
wildlife to possession?
Answers to these questions depend on some prior account of rights, such as
the rule of capture for wild animals. But once the capture takes place on public
lands, it becomes far less clear whether the landowner (the state) or the
individual entrant owns the animal upon capture. In part the difficulty stems
from the analogous dispute within private law. The basic English rule is that the
owner of the soil is entitled to the ownership of any wild animal that a trespasser
captured on his property.55 Yet the Roman law awarded ownership to the
55
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56

trespasser, even if the landowner was entitled to bar his entrance. But that
private analogy does not quite work given that the state ordinarily cannot
exclude any individual from public property on a whim, but must show cause
for its decision. So once again the indefiniteness of the system of rights leads to
enormous amounts of jockeying. The epic battles that one witnesses between the
environmentalists and the westerners do not stop therefore when private lands
are subject to public appropriation. They continue on unabated with each
management decision of what forms of land use should be allowed and what
should be prohibited.
To make matters worse, resources subject to public control are subject to more
than simple decisions about use. The question always arises whether the
government can, or should, charge for the use of facilities. In this context, the
political dynamic favors the emergence of queues, as government officials are
reluctant for political reasons to charge anything close to a market clearing price
for use of public resources. It is better for individuals to wait outside Yellowstone
Park for hours, engines running, than to raise the price to a market level, because
the price might exclude someone who does not have sufficient wealth to back his
utility preferences. The upshot of course is that individuals able to finance their
use of public parks now, by queuing, must pay with time instead of cash, which
in the effort to favor individuals of relatively low income, creates all the
imbalance of any system that does not allow price to rise to clear queues. Yet
because the land is within the public domain, no constitutional device can force
the government to deal with its property as a rational private owner—to raise
the price until the queues run away.
The situation here is representative of a larger difficulty in obtaining balance
on public lands. At present it is easier to appropriate funds for the acquisition of
public lands (often at bargain prices) than it is to appropriate public funds for the
maintenance of lands that have already been acquired. There is thus a constant
chorus of complaints about the run-down nature of public facilities and the
erratic level of management on public lands. The ideal program matches
acquisition with management, which requires that we either cut back on the
acquisition or improve on the management, or do both in some combination. As
between the two, I have little doubt that in the present situation, scaling back on
acquisition, or even divesting public lands, is the preferred approach. The
current pattern of acquisition is spurred on by compensation rules that do not
take into account the full losses of condemnation, both on the condemnee and
other members of his community. Yet the process removes lands from the tax
rolls and invites a continuation of the erratic management practices which
political concerns make it difficult to correct.

56
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2. Transfers of Resources from Public to Private Hands. One question that
remains is what constitutional constraints, if any, apply to the transfer of public
to private property? At this point, the possibility for imposing effective judicial
oversight improves. To begin with the private analogy, courts are rightly
reluctant to order an accounting between cotenants for every expenditure that
each makes on the common property. The administrative costs are quite high,
and the dangers of making serious mistakes is quite large. But on the termination
of the concurrent interests, it becomes feasible to make a once-and-for-all
assessment of the various contributions, and this is commonly done by giving
each joint tenant credit for the cost or the value (or perhaps, whichever is
57
lower).
A similar set of rules could be adapted to dispositions of public lands to
private parties. Ideally, these transfers should follow the same norms applicable
to takings transactions: No one should be left worse off and the public at large
should be left better off.58 One possible way to achieve that result is to conduct an
auction so that public resources end up in the hands of the highest bidder, with
the wealth in question coming to the government so that all individuals who
have lost their share in a specific asset will receive in its place at least a pro rata
share of the proceeds of sale. Even this strategy does not deal with differential
intensities of preferences with respect to the lands moving out of public solution.
If certain hunting land is sold off at bid, the environmentalists may be pleased by
the identity of the ultimate purchaser, and thus gain two ways: a portion of the
public funds, and ownership of the land by their preferred party. Or the
distribution of benefits and burdens from the transaction could run in reverse.
The sad truth is that even market-value sales will result in substantial wealth
transfers from one group to another, and that fact alone is sufficient to set up the
usual incentives for seeking political advantage.
The problem here is not confined to public lands, and, currently, the issue has
been squarely raised with government distribution of two kinds of assets once
located within the public domain. The first of course is the spectrum, which
conceivably could be allocated in one of three ways. A first possession rule could
allocate it to the party who first uses it. That system might have worked well at
the onset of radio when the rate of occupation was relatively slow, but less well
in the current setting where sophisticated parties could occupy the entire
spectrum in the twinkling of an eye. The trivial gaps in time are too small to
justify the absolute priorities they create. An auction works better than with land
because no one can identify those groups who made more intense use of the
spectrum before it was sold to private parties. Yet even if the recent auctions of
For a more detailed statement of the rules, see 2 American Law of Property § 6 (1952).
For my earlier development of this position, see Richard A. Epstein, “The Public Trust
Doctrine,” 7 Cato J. 411 (1987).
57
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the broadband spectrum for high speed telecommunications, distributional
objectives were allowed to creep into the process, namely, to insure some level of
59
minority ownership in the successful bids. But for the traditional allocation of
broadcast frequencies, the spectrum is allocated through comparative hearings
60
that invite large amounts of rent dissipation. Here the object of the massive
expenditures is often to gain the right to a license which the lucky recipient can
then turn around (after one year’s wait) and sell off to the highest bidder. Rent
dissipation is then followed by a private auction that puts not a single dollar in
the public purse.
A second giveaway of public resources applies to intellectual property, which
often falls in the public domain. Thus the Copyright Term Extension Act61 has
extended the terms of existing copyrights for 20 years without exacting any
corresponding quid quo pro from their holders. Copyright does not count as a
natural right, but necessarily requires the power of the state to secure it, which is
done under the United States Constitution by Art. I, § 8, cl 8: “To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
62
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
Congress ordered the FCC to act to “ensure that ... businesses owned by members of
minority groups and women are given the opportunity to participate in the provision of
spectrum-based services, and, for such purposes, consider the use of tax certificates, bidding
preferences, and other procedures.” 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(4)(D). For a defense of the system, see Ian
Ayres & Peter Cramton, “Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the
FCC Increased Auction Competition,” 48 Stan. L. Rev. 761 (1996). But once again the argument
often seems odd, for it is unclear whether the objective is higher revenues or more minority
participation. But it is wishful thinking to believe that the process can do both. The process can to
some extent increase the price at which the asset is sold, by forcing the winning bidder closer to
his reservation price. But in other cases, the subsidized bidder will win, reducing the money paid
into public coffers. In addition, minority bidders often delegate in advance corporate control to
the larger players with whom they team up in the bidding process. And the entire scheme
depends on the untested hypothesis that minority owners (as opposed to owners that can hire
skilled marketers) are better able to reach certain portions of the population. An outright sale of
frequencies, with the time brokering by some network owners that did no care to supervise their
content, would work far better. Naturally, time-brokering is explicitly banned under the current
statute. See Cosmopolitan Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 581 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
60 On which see, Ronald H. Coase, “The Federal Communications Commission,” 2 J. Law &
Econ. 1 (1959); Thomas Hazlett, “The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum,”
33 J. Law & Econ. 133 (1990).
61 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, (CTEA) Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827.
62 The use of federal power came out of recognition of the inability to find a distinct locus for
intellectual property. The national protection obviated the need for different and overlapping
state regimes. That problem is not, however, on the international scene. For the denial of the
natural right approach in the context of patents, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966):
“The patent system was not destined to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries
Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.” No less an authority
than Thomas Jefferson agreed see VI Writings of Thomas Jefferson 180-181 (H.A. Washington ed.)
The point extends to copyrights, which are yoked together with patents in the same constitutional
clause.
59
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A world that denies all protection for writings and inventors directs labor
toward other less-productive endeavors. Yet a perpetual copyright or patent has
the offsetting inconvenience of blocking the use of these writings and inventions,
even though the marginal cost of their additional use is zero, or very close to it.
It is no easy task in the abstract to determine the optimal trade-offs between
the incentive to create and the rate of dissemination of works once created. But it
is tolerably clear that writings and other works of art are distinctive in ways in
which inventions are not. The former tend to be unique creations, while the latter
will usually be discovered in light of general knowledge and the prior art.
Accordingly, the optimal term of years for patentable inventions should be, and
is, far shorter (20 years for a utility patent), than for copyrights (life plus 50
years). Yet it is hard to see how any form of constitutional inquiry dictates the
precise term of either.
That global structural judgment, however, hardly justifies the retroactive
extension of a copyright term for writings that are about to go out from
copyright. Now one side of the traditional copyright bargain has vanished,
because the additional term adds no new incentive to create works already in
creation. Yet the longer term restricts from treating the work as part of the public
domain. Congress cannot grant copyright protection to works that have fallen
63
into the public domain . Yet it is hard to distinguish this case from one which
extends a copyright that has only a single day to run. The analogy to the
common law doctrine of estates gives, as it were, the public (which here means
each member thereof) a remainder interest in the copyrighted material that vests
in possession upon the expiration of the copyright term.64 Once the bargain has
been struck, then it should be as impermissible to lengthen the term of an
existing copyright as it is to shorten it.
To see why, compare this transaction with other dispositions of public
property. Suppose that the state has an easement over some private property
that allows members of the public to reach a public beach. Should the state be
able to surrender this easement to the servient tenant for nothing when the
easement has value to its regular users? To take a corporate analogy,
shareholders should be able to block any giveaway of corporate assets to insiders
when nothing is received in return.
Unfortunately, our citizen/shareholders do not have comparable rights to
block unilateral transfers of public assets to private parties when no adequate
See Bridge Publications, Inc. v. F.A.C.T. Net, Inc., 183 F.R.D. 254, 262 (D. Colo. 1998) (“Once a
work enters the public domain, it remains there irrevocably.”) This statement is perhaps too
strong, but if it leaves the public domain, then the public should at the very least receive a quid
pro quo in exchange.
64 See, for a succinct and powerful statement of the arguments on copyright, plaintiff’s brief at
52-62, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999), as prepared by Professor Lawrence Lessig.
63
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quid pro quo has been received in return. One clear obstacle to legal protection
comes from the doctrine of standing, which insulates government decisions over
public assets from judicial scrutiny. It is another version of res publica res nullius.
Since no one has a large enough stake in the process, no one has “standing” to
65
challenge it, as the law now precludes “citizen” or “taxpayer” suits attacking
some “‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a
large class of citizens.”66 The standing rule thus blocks the public equivalent of
the corporate derivative suit.67
The argument seems misguided, for no one has satisfactorily explained the
standing doctrine on either textual or structural grounds. The word “standing”
does not appear in Article III of the Constitution, which notes that the judicial
Power “shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the
68
Constitution, the Law of the United States, and Treaties made.” That language
clearly excludes advisory opinions on the validity of legislation before it has been
challenged. But a claim of both citizen and taxpayer is adverse to the state and
thus raises “case” within the meaning of Art. III, § 2. The pragmatic justification
offered in response asserts that the floodgates will open if the standing barriers
are removed. But as with derivative suits, the real peril is the opposite, because
individual litigants often lack the large stake needed to pursue such difficult
litigation. But the standing barrier only aggravates this problem, for what is
needed are rules to coordinate separate suits, or to allow class actions or
permissive joinder (as with derivative suits). Once again sensible private
analogies give the best guidance to the needed legal rules in the public realm.
Standing then is little more than an arbitrary barrier to immunize legislative
action over the use of public resources from constitutional oversight.
3. A Revival of the Public Trust Doctrine. “Standing” aside, should the public
trust doctrine be brought to bear against the United States for assets that are
transferred without compensation from the public to the private domain. Some
years ago I suggested that the flip side to the takings clause provided “Nor shall
69
public property be transferred to private use, without just compensation.”
Inserting “transferred” for “taken” reflects the obvious fact that the government
For a general statement of the standing doctrine, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Id.
67 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (disallowing taxpayer suits to challenge public
expenditures). The Mellon rule is subject to a narrow, if somewhat unprincipled exception for the
case of transfers to religious organizations challenged under the establishment clause. See Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). But there is good reason for the exception to become the rule as a means
to combat sweetheart deals between government and favored organization. The fear is often
expressed that the frequency of such suits will paralyze the courts. I suspect that the real risk here
is that too few people will have the incentive to bear the private costs needed to stop such a
transfer.
68 U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2
69 Richard A. Epstein, “The Public Trust Doctrine,” 7 Cato J. 411 (1987).
65
66

HP

July 6, 2001

31

cannot be compelled to surrender public property to private parties. That said,
the parallel seems quite striking, and has received some Constitutional backing
70
in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, which authorized setting aside of the
transfer of submerged lands from the state to private parties on grounds that no
one can quite articulate. The public trust doctrine lacks a secure constitutional
71
base over government-owned property. As was the case in Eldred v. Reno, that
textual gap has led courts to confine the public use doctrine to the submerged
lands.
That judicial reticence is misguided for several reasons. First, in the analogous
takings clause, the phrase, “private property” has been consistently applied to
cover all forms of property, not just land. Most specifically, trade secrets, patents
and copyrights are all forms of property that cannot be taken from their owners,
72
without just compensation. In addition, this case is still stronger than the
property case. The decision to protect writings into copyrighted material
necessary takes away not only the undivided public interest in the property as
such, but it also necessarily infringes on the members of the public’s commonlaw liberty to speak as they please. The Constitution not only has property
protection but it also has speech protections, which are normally subjected to a
higher standard of judicial scrutiny—intermediate scrutiny to be precise for
restrictions that are not content based, which these apparently are not. And that
position requires that one show that the restrictions on speech are sufficient to
advance some important government interest. The initial protection of copyright
counts of course as that interest, because in part it spurs public discourse and
debate by offering incentives for parties to speak on matters of public interest
and concern. But no such interest can be identified for the extension of protection
of speech that has already been generated.
Again the pattern of litigation in Eldred shows how the government has
managed to wiggle out of this standard speech power. In effect it skirts the
question of serious justification by holding that the jurisdictional grant over
copyright subjects the government to at most rational basis review: so long as
any interest could be advanced on behalf of the statute, the copyright interest
73
prevails. Deference to congressional decisions becomes the order of the day. The
government has been allowed to argue that removing copyrights from the public
domain aids in their “dissemination” when in fact higher prices reduce public
146 U.S. 387 (1893).
74 F.Supp. 2d 1(1999). The decision was so brief as to be disrespectful of the issues raised.
72 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
73 See, e.g. Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984):
“Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major
technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. Congress has the
constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied
permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.”
70
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74

utilization. In the absence of any discernible quid pro quo, the CTEA is just an
old-fashioned giveaway of public assets, cloaked in a set of excuses that only
extreme judicial deference would tolerate.
IV. Conclusion
One of the missions of a sound system of governance is to facilitate transfers
of resources, both tangible and intangible, to higher-valued users. Frequently,
voluntary contract encourages those exchanges even for assets that are owned
collectively. Often government is a party to these exchanges, either by coercion,
as through eminent domain, or by voluntary transaction. Yet in both contexts the
task is to create positive sum transactions where all members of the public to the
extent possible share pro rata in the distribution of the gains. Not only does that
norm respond to a strong sense of fairness, but it also holds out the possibility of
maximizing the gains from these transactions over the long run.
Equally clear, however, is the somber proposition that this regime cannot
sustain itself. Transitions always spark danger, whether we speak of getting out
of an automobile or changing property rights regimes. Transitions thus require
the highest diligence, both legislative and judicial. Some knaves may slip
through a well-constructed net, but those risks are multiplied when lax
constitutional standards allow factional behavior to flourish. As Madison noted,
transitions are difficult enough to counteract when legislative and judicial
officials are conscious of the perils they pose. They become well-nigh impossible
to counteract when these same officials refusal to acknowledge the perils they
face. Yet today’s massive slippage in the joints is not an inevitable fact of nature.
In dealing with these issues, the basic attitudes toward government and property
count for far more than the particulars of any system of property rights, public or
private, tangible or intellectual. Those people who follow the good government
model of behavior may take pride in republican virtue as a sufficient safeguard
against political misbehavior. In so doing, they could endorse a low (or rational
basis) standard of review under which anything goes. But those who recognize
that public virtue is a scarce commodity should favor a higher level of judicial
scrutiny of legislative action to improve the odds of securing limited government
by Constitutional means.

74 The other justifications offered fare no better. See S. Rep. No. 104-315, 104th Cong., at 11
(1996). For example, the Committee Report denies that the Act amounts to a perpetual term, but
does not preclude a subsequent term extension. Finally, the 20-year extension, we are told, it
meant to preserve the older objective to protect “the author and at least one generation of heirs.”
Thus the CTEA “merely modifies the length of protection in nominal terms to reflect the scientific
and demographic changes that have rendered the life-plus-50 term insufficient to meet this end.”
But longer life expectancy (even with later marriage) means that the writer who dies in his 80s
leaves children in their 50s. Longer life already offers greater copyright protection.
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